Communicating Global Interdependence

A Framework Message Memo

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COMMUNICATING GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE

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This memo reports on communications research conducted by a team of scholars and communications practitioners under the direction of the FrameWorks Institute for the Global Interdependence Initiative, a project of the Aspen Institute. Originally drafted in July 2000, it has been updated to include more recent research results.

The purpose of this Message Memo is to demonstrate ways to apply the research results to the overall task of reframing American attitudes about international engagement. Written from the perspective of a communication practitioner, its intent is to complement, not replace, the actual research reports. It is designed to answer the following questions:

• How can the FrameWorks research help communications and policy staff better understand what they are up against in attempting to win public support for policies that recognize global interdependence?

• How can this research help individual organizations become more strategic as they attempt to win support for specific positions?

• How can it help foster collaborations across organizations, recognizing how cross-issue work enhances each organization?

• How can this research help direct organizational energies to the most important issues and audiences?

• How should this research inform our day-to-day communications about global issues?

This memo is organized as follows: first, necessary background information; second, overall findings; third, presentation of a situation analysis; fourth, a review of the findings in light of original goals and earlier hypotheses; fifth, specific framing suggestions and activities. Of necessity, this memo moves from a research review and analysis to very specific and simple applications. Its variations in tone and format result from this dual purpose.

I. Background

For just over a year, the FrameWorks research team pursued a series of studies designed to further our understanding of how Americans think about global interdependence and related issues and what consequences these orientations and opinions have for specific global policy debates. The goal of this work was determined by the Aspen Institute at the founding of the Global Interdependence Initiative (GII), when concerned funders and experts in global issues chose to investigate the role that communications played in determining the climate for U.S. involvement in international engagement.
While other opinion research had begun to suggest that the public may not be as isolationist and self-interested as conventional wisdom would have us believe, the role of media in confirming or contesting these more cooperative international values had not been sufficiently examined. At the same time, the role of media in directing policymakers’ attention and attitudes seemed of paramount importance, given the suggestion from these earlier surveys that policymakers were quick to dispute the data that showed a more internationally interested public; the possibility that the media served to discount the public’s values through the choice and presentation of international news required investigation. And, finally, while media might prove an important vehicle for shaping opinions, questions were raised about the potential efficacy of trusted intermediary interpreters — NGOs, public interest groups, civic and business organizations — in articulating for the public an alternative worldview that defined cooperative multilateral engagement as the embodiment of these basic values.

A. The Approach

To address these questions, the FrameWorks Institute applied a method called strategic frame analysis. This multi-disciplinary approach to communications research and practice pays attention to the public’s deeply held worldviews and widely held assumptions. This approach was developed by a group of scholars and practitioners capable of studying those assumptions and testing them to determine their impact on social policies. Recognizing that there is more than one way to tell a story, strategic frame analysis taps into decades of research on how people think and communicate. The result is an empirically-driven communications process that makes academic research understandable, interesting, and usable to help people solve social problems.

This approach is strategic in that it not only deconstructs the dominant frames that drive reasoning on public issues, but it also identifies those models most likely to stimulate public reconsideration and enumerates their elements (reframing). Strategic frame analysis offers policy advocates a way to work systematically through the challenges that are likely to confront the introduction of new legislation or social policies, to anticipate attitudinal barriers to support, and to develop research-based strategies to overcome public misunderstanding.

This approach is especially well-suited to the Global Interdependence Initiative whose purpose was described by Colin Campbell as “developing and deploying a way of talking about international engagement that will make global issues more salient and more mobilizing in the eyes of the American public... (and enabling) citizens’ groups to argue on behalf of specific causes within a coherent, consistent, ethical and practical worldview that promotes cooperative international engagement across a broad range of issues and appeals to a broad range of audiences” (Remarks to the European Foundation Center Assembly, Berlin, Germany, November 8, 1999). From its inception, the GII has been about setting the public agenda, framing the discourse and priming Americans for cooperative international engagement.

B. The Research Base

This memo is written at the completion of a sizeable body of work, but notably without several significant elements of the research. The work that informs this memo can be
thought of as addressing three critical areas: 1) how the American news media covers international issues; 2) how the American public thinks about global issues; and 3) how policymakers and opinion leaders think about these same issues. The research conducted to date is as follows:

**On Media**

- A content analysis of national and local news programming on global issues during a five-week period in 1999, reviewing over 10,000 news stories and more than 200 hours of airtime to determine the quantity, form and substance of current international reporting, resulting in “The Myopic Neighbor: Local and National Network Television Coverage of the World” by S. Robert Lichter, Daniel R. Amundson and Linda S. Lichter, Center for Media and Public Affairs, June 2000 (1).

- A behind-the-scenes analysis of how journalists frame and cover foreign policy issues, based on Susan Moeller’s popular book *Compassion Fatigue* (Routledge, 1999) and supplemented by three weeks of media sampling and specific analyses of the presentations of victimized children and of human rights in stories of international affairs, resulting in “Four Habits of International News Reporting,” by Susan Moeller, December 1999 (2).

- A review of the recent literature on the relationship of media and international issues, resulting in “Veterans of Perception: GII Antecedents in the Literature on Media and Foreign Policy,” by Susan Nall Bales, FrameWorks Institute, January 2000 and “Communications and Foreign Policy: A Brief Annotated Bibliography of the Recent Literature” by Susan Nall Bales with Adria Goodson, FrameWorks Institute, January 2000 (3).


**On Public Attitudes**


- An analysis of elicitations (in-depth one-on-one interviews) with 15 Americans from different age groups, ethnicities, socioeconomic backgrounds, and political persuasions, resulting in “American Understandings of the United States’ Role in the World: Findings from Cognitive Interviews,” by Axel Aubrun and Joseph Grady, Cultural Logic, October 14, 1999 (5).
• a national opinion survey of 2,400 adult Americans designed to test the impact of different priming issues and statements on a core set of international attitudes and policies, resulting in “Primed and Suspect: How the Public Responds to Different Frames on Global Issues,” by Margaret Bostrom, 2001 (6).

On Policymaker Attitudes

• An analysis of elicitations (in-depth one-on-one interviews) with 10 policymakers representing a range of roles in government and private institutions, and diverse political perspectives, resulting in “Policymakers and International Engagement: Findings from the Cognitive Elicitations,” by Axel Aubrun and Joseph Grady, July 10, 2000 (7).

• A textual analysis of mainstream print media, resulting in “Ten Differences Between Public and Expert Understandings of International Affairs,” by Joseph Grady and Axel Aubrun, Cultural Logic, November 1, 1999 (8).

• An analysis of the major metaphor domains that inform our understanding of foreign policy issues, their implications for global interdependence, and their alternatives, resulting in “Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy: Why Strategic Framing Matters,” by George Lakoff, December 1999. (NB: While this paper is also about public understanding, its focus is on the elite discourse that serves to drive public attitudes toward certain models and policy preferences, so I have placed it in this category) (9).

There have been several overviews of the research-in-progress provided by the FrameWorks Institute as prefaces to the publication of these reports. In addition, these investigations resulted in two synthesis documents, which inform this Memo and identify effective reframes:

- an analysis of the cognitive cultural models that structure perceptions of global interdependence, the metaphors that express them, and an assessment of reframing options, resulting in “Promoting American Engagement: A Catalog of Recommended Frames and Language,” by Axel Aubrun and Joseph Grady, Cultural Logic, June 5, 2000 (10).

- a detailed analysis of the way people think about foreign policy, the frames they use, their implications for policy, and the potential for using and misusing prospective global reframes, published as “The Mind and the World: Changing the Very Idea of American Foreign Policy,” from George Lakoff, 2001 (14).

In addition to this research, now virtually complete, two reports remain outstanding as of this writing. These include:

- an analysis of a media effects experiment using selected news footage from the local and national media content analysis to measure the impact of dominant and deviant forms of news on global policy attitudes, to be conducted by Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., Center for Communications and Community, UCLA (12).
a supplemental analysis of media effects, using the same footage but available on the Internet, with a wider cross-section of public viewers including policymakers, to be conducted by Shanto Iyengar, Professor of Political Science and Communications, Stanford University (13).

Additionally, we have had the benefit of research conducted by: (A) Celinda Lake (presentation to the Global Interdependence Working Group, May 26, 1999); (B) Steven Kull and I. M. Destler (Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism, Brookings Institution Press, 1999); (C) Ethel Klein (“Becoming Global Citizens: How Americans View the World at the Beginning of the 21st Century,” Oxfam America, May 2000); and (D) Beldon Russonello & Stewart (“Connecting Women in the U.S. and Global Issues, A Women’s Lens on Global Issues,” May 2000).

In order to simplify attribution among these various reports, they are referred to throughout the text by number or letter as set out above.

II. Overall Findings

There are seven key points that emerge from the research to date, as the research relates directly to understanding the frames that influence and underlie international discourse and policy. They are:

1. **We have more of a policymaker problem on this set of issues than a public opinion problem.**

2. **The public problem that does exist results from a misperception that America is doing it all, bearing the burden of the world; but even this misperception does not translate into an unwillingness to support international efforts.**

3. **The other major public problem is an inability to assign responsibility to any actor – governments, NGOs, business, etc. The public lacks an understanding of cause and effect or even a strong image of effective international solutions. They do not know whom to hold accountable for global issues, or what respective roles government and private groups should play.**

4. **These two public problems are reflections of current media frames.**

5. **While the news media fails to educate Americans about causes and consequences, its impact on public values is not as pernicious as one might expect.**

6. **Media is dependent upon a small number of authorized sources for news, creating opportunities for influence.**

7. **Depending upon what you want to accomplish in the global arena, different issues and arguments work for and against you, and their impact is more directly related to the reasoning they set up than their literal issue domains.**
Each of these is examined in greater depth in the following pages.

1. **We have more of a policymaker problem on this set of issues than a public opinion problem.**

As Margaret Bostrom concludes from her review of previous survey research, reinforced by the findings from our own national opinion survey, “Americans care more about global problems than most polls indicate.”

This concern is, however, more evident at the level of core values and beliefs than it is in consistent expressions of specific opinions and policy preferences or in a concrete knowledge base. Thus, we see strong support across many surveys for an active U.S. role in world affairs. How that role should be implemented, where U.S. energies and funds should be directed, and what should be the goals of our involvement are all highly volatile questions, which appear to be extremely sensitive to specific situational dynamics and to presentational cues.

The important point is that, as Steve Kull asserted in his 1999 summary of public opinion (B), the new isolationalism is indeed a myth. We found nothing in either our qualitative or quantitative work to suggest otherwise.

The literature of media and foreign policy are clear on at least one critical point: for policymakers, the public has little “standing” on international issues (3). Americans are viewed by policymakers as woefully naive and uninformed, and their participation in foreign policy debates is often discounted as limiting diplomatic options and threatening security.

And, when policymakers do look to the public for approval, they tend to look to media as the proxy for public opinion. Thus, we begin to see the emergence of a kind of self-fulfilling policy prophesy in which the global mayhem news frame that dominates coverage is viewed as the “pictures in the public’s mind” and the only kind of intervention necessitated is aid to victims of disasters.

The fact that Americans see the world through a different lens than do policymakers further contributes to this distancing of citizens from the policy discourse. As Aubrun and Grady admonish (10), “A central challenge facing the GII is to create a discourse that seems natural to both policy elites and the general public. These groups bring different assumptions to the table.”

Policymakers, and other elites, tend to view international issues through an entirely different set of models than those instinctively used by the public. Relations between countries are “games” and the world is a chess board (7). Two metaphors predominate, according to Lakoff (9): the Balance of Power Metaphor, in which the “international system is a physical system in which state-objects are exerting force on one another, war is collapse of the system, and the danger of war is instability; and the Rational Actor Metaphor, in which “each nation is a person who acts rationally to maximize his self-interest (the ‘national interest’), that is to maximize gains and minimize costs and losses.” While there are numerous other metaphors at play in experts’ rich thinking about
international affairs, these two are especially prevalent and demonstrate the dramatic differences between where the public starts on these issues and where policymakers are coming from.

It is little wonder that, reasoning from these different perspectives, elites and the public value different issues. For example, Ethel Klein (C) found improving the global environment to be a top foreign policy priority for 50 percent of the public, compared with 41 percent of media elites, 26 percent of business and financial leaders, and 22 percent of Hill policy staff.

More media — or at least more of the same kind of media — does not promise much remedy. As John Zaller has pointed out (3), the more attentive Americans are to media, the more their opinions begin to reflect those of policymakers: “Elite and media influence is likely to be limited to those citizens who are sufficiently attentive to politics to be aware of what elites are saying...and then the most politically aware citizens are most susceptible to influence because they are most heavily exposed to an elite consensus that they have no partisan basis for resisting.”

While mass media is thought of as affecting the populace at large, it sometimes plays a more powerful role in policymaker opinion formation. In a study of the actual impact of what he termed “icons of outrage,” or those famous photos widely credited with having had an impact on foreign policy attitudes among the public, David Perlmutter found instead “a first person effect where discourse elites feel that a picture has an effect on them (or should have one) and then, often falsely, project this effect on the general viewing public” (Photojournalism and Foreign Policy: Icons of Outrage in International Crises, Praeger, 1998). Perlmutter found that pictures such as those associated with Tet or Tiananmen have a powerful effect on policymakers, as “policy is explained by pointing at specific images in the press.” The very belief in the image’s power drives a response; it makes issues more salient to discourse elites themselves (3). Following this line of reasoning, it is likely that, given the shallow coverage accorded the WTO nationally, the power of its visual imagery of protest has had more effect on policymakers than on the public at large. The protest then becomes strategically effective in its use of media as proxy for public opinion, directed at policymakers – more effective even than the numerous public opinion polls that, Kull notes, policymakers discount.

Finally, another reason for the public’s lack of standing on these issues is that there appear to be few electoral consequences for policymakers on these issues. As Kull and Destler (B) put it, “(A)ccurate readings of public attitudes is not a day-to-day necessity for U.S. foreign policy practitioners, and because the political market does not punish those who misread the public, myths about public attitudes can persist.”

There are few reasons for policymakers to connect with the public and many reasons not to do so. As Aubrun and Grady note (7), “policymakers are, to some extent, constrained by the discourse of their peers — when speaking privately they are less inclined to conform to language and opinions accepted among their professional and/or policy colleagues.”

George Lakoff has suggested that there are two questions that policymakers ask themselves about any policy they are asked to advocate: “Will people think I’m nuts?”
“Will people think I’m doing the right thing? In order to engage policymakers, the FrameWorks research must find new ways to express global issues that pass these tests.

2. **The public problem that does exist results from a misperception that America is doing it all, bearing the burden of the world, but even this misperception does not translate into an unwillingness to support international efforts.**

In fact, as the Women’s Lens survey attests (D), some Americans take pride in the country’s leadership role. “Pride as an American” ranked second only to “responsibility for future generations” among the top reasons for international involvement, and significantly ahead of “protecting our economic interests.”

The problem arises because Americans only see their own efforts, while those of other countries are virtually invisible (1). As a consequence, they believe the U.S. is shouldering the majority, if not all of, the responsibility for world peace (5). In interviews with FrameWorks researchers (8), both experts and ordinary Americans reflected this view. Grady and Aubrun (8) also call attention to the tendency in print media to exaggerate U.S. contributions, even when it is involved in multilateral efforts, a variation on the “domestic news hook”:

U.S., Japan, Other Nations Pledge $7.9 Billion in Food Subsidies
(subheadline of a story explaining that the U.S. pledged $300 million to Indonesia, while Japan pledged $1.3 billion and unidentified other countries pledged $6.3 billion. WP, 7/31/98, p. A20)

Again, the conventional wisdom would be to attack the misperception with a “public education” campaign designed to get the fact in front of Americans that, contrary to conventional wisdom, U.S. foreign aid spending accounts for only a small percentage of our total budget. Our research suggests that this tactic is likely to end in failure. When informants were confronted with such information, they showed momentary surprise, and then reverted to their old patterns of reasoning. A core rule of strategic frame analysis is at play here: if the facts don’t fit the frame, it is the facts that are rejected, not the frame.

There are ways to introduce information that help Americans get over this misperception — but they are not literal rebuttals (see below). The good news is that the consequences of the misperception are not so great that they inhibit support for international involvement. As Bostrom points out (6), while a plurality (43%) believe the United States is doing more than it should in other parts of the world, two-thirds (63%) still favor giving economic assistance to other countries, with one-third (33%) strongly favoring. This fiction does, however, energize the opposition. While only 29% oppose economic assistance, nearly all are strongly opposed (21%).

While it may ultimately prove beneficial to GII communicators to show other actors on the global stage, providing assistance and leadership, the fact that Americans perceive the U.S. as doing more than its share does not prove the stumbling block to international engagement and aid that we might have thought. It is important not to put communications energies into solving a problem of fact that may not have profound consequences for policy.
3. The other major public problem is an inability to assign responsibility to any actor – governments, NGOs, business, etc. The public lacks an understanding of cause and effect or even a strong image of effective international solutions. They do not know whom to hold accountable for global issues, or what role government and private groups should play.

This is a problem that is absolutely critical to the success of GII efforts. A number of our priming experiments (5) worked to pack issues of importance to the GII into the definition of engagement and to dramatically increase their salience. However, agenda-setting alone is insufficient to accomplish GII ends. The public has to connect these issues to governments and to politics, or accountability disperses among a host of potential actors, with no one left in charge, just as we saw in the opinions of those exposed to the dominant media frame.

As Ethel Klein concluded in her review of public opinion for Oxfam (C), “The fact that Americans acknowledge that they are part of a global community...does not mean that they have learned how to ‘think globally’ about solutions to these problems. For many Americans, these are very confusing and potentially disconcerting times. The solutions they have been offered are often narrowly framed in technical language that goes against their instincts about how to handle change.”

Thus, it will not be sufficient for the GII to reframe the problem unless accountability is also packed into the frame. For example, FrameWorks survey respondents primed with the moral norms model moved away from the U.S. government as the most effective and useful source of help (-4% over the control) and into the “don’t know” category (+5%). This despite the fact that the moral norms model was extremely successful in raising the salience of such issues as combating world poverty and hunger (+10), protecting the global environment (+9), preventing human rights abuses (+11), and promoting equal education so girls in developing countries can obtain the same education as boys (+9). The moral norms model redefines what’s important to foreign policy, but it fails to help Americans understand whom to hold accountable for setting and enforcing those norms (see page 21 for a definition of the moral norms model, or see 6 and 9 for more discussion of the model).

Interestingly, where Americans are clear on whom to hold accountable – in the realm of domestic issues – they are more likely to feel efficacious. Both domestic primes, for infectious disease and the environment, increased people’s assessment that they could have an impact, over their international equivalents.

It is quite possible that American frustration over not being able to identify causes and solutions is misread as “compassion fatigue”; our research demonstrates, however, that Americans remain reasonably stalwart in their commitment to relieve international distress even when they cannot find anyone to hold accountable for causing the problem.

4. These two public problems are reflections of current media frames.
In summarizing their detailed analysis of more than 10,000 TV news stories over a six-week period (1), the Center for Media and Public Affairs concluded:

“Little of the material we found on local or national television news could reasonably be expected to increase either the comprehension ordinary citizens have of global issues, or their representation in the public debate of America’s role in the wider world. The sheer volume of global news has gradually declined on the networks and remains minuscule on most local newscasts. The coverage that does exist is largely episodic in format, prosaic in presentation, and shallow in context. Television news typically emphasizes the ‘otherness’ of the world outside our borders, portraying the international arena as a subsidiary sphere of little concern to most Americans except as a place where bad things happen, and the United States occasionally needs to intervene to set them right.”

It is little wonder in this context that, as Ethel Klein notes (C), “foreign aid...is now seen as charity.” Indeed, the very definition of intervention becomes relief from mayhem.

Of particular concern to the analysts was the fact that “the global news agenda was skewed heavily...toward topics such as war, natural disasters, industrial accidents, crimes, and demonstrations.” Moreover, the news was “overwhelmingly episodic, focusing on discrete events and short-term crises.” As the work of Shanto Iyengar demonstrates, “exposure to episodic news makes viewers less likely to hold public officials accountable for the existence of some problem and also less likely to hold them responsible for alleviating it (Is Anyone Responsible?, University of Chicago Press, 1991:2). Finally, and perhaps most important in terms of our research:

“Global news rarely conveyed the impression that Americans had a stake in global issues, beyond a humanitarian interest in assisting disaster victims. Only a small proportion of stories dealt with the causes of international problems, and those that did focused mainly on the obvious, such as natural disasters and accidents attributed to human error, rather than more complicated historical, ethnic, religious, or socio-political processes. Attention was directed mainly to what was about to happen, not why a particular event was happening and how it fit into broader patterns of similar events. As a corollary, there was even less attention to political solutions for the problems that were reported. The United States was rarely seen as the cause of international problems, and even more rarely was it seen as part of the solution, on either local or network newscasts. Even the WTO protests generated little discussion of ways to resolve the problems that the protesters thrust into the news agenda.”

It is little wonder from this coverage that, as Grady and Aubrun concluded (5), “In their day to day lives, Americans are scarcely aware of other countries, their governments and their actions.”

5. While the news media fails to educate Americans about causes and consequences, its impact on public values is not as pernicious as one might expect.

It is puzzling to consider how Americans can continue to hold positive international views and continue to support policies of engagement when their nightly news is so filled
with mayhem and so little actual information about the world. The answer, as Aubrun and Grady noted (8), is that “public understandings are not closely based on media representations, even though those representations are a major source of information for the public.”

The bad news is that both the quality and the quantity of American TV reporting on international news is insufficient to provide a knowledge and conceptual base for furthering American interest in global interdependence. The good news is that, as superficial and episodic as this coverage is, its toll on core American beliefs is not as corrosive as one might expect. In fact, the dominant media frame tends to quicken public concern, to motivate people to want to exert some control on an out-of-control arena and to provide relief to victims. At the same time, however, it disperses accountability; the lack of causation in the dominant media narrative ensures that the public does not know whom to hold responsible for these international situations and, therefore, does not know in whom to vest authority for fixing these situations in the future.

Further analysis of the dominant media frames directs us to consider what media critics like George Gerbner have described as the steady “drip drip” of negative news frames on our understanding of the world. As Aubrun and Grady assert (11), “by presenting most global events as though they were acts of nature, American TV news...is likely to evoke a state of mind in which people observe global events from a safe refuge, spectating rather than participating actively in them.” Indeed, public support for foreign aid is not directly inconsistent with this “refuge stance”; you can believe the world is a scary place and choose to stay at home while opting to make it less scary through development assistance. As organizations look for opportunities to create cognitive dissonance between the public’s mediated impressions of the world and their actual experience – whether through travel, study abroad, or sister city exchanges – these opportunities are likely to be colored and eclipsed by public perceptions of a mean globe, home to terrorists, earthquakes, and infectious disease.

6. Media is dependent upon a small number of authorized sources for news, creating opportunities for influence.

U.S. non-government sources account for nearly one-third (32%) of all sources quoted in news stories (1), and three-quarters of this group came from “the elite sectors of various foreign policy experts, academics, think tank scholars, etc.” However, as the Center for Media and Public Affairs is quick to point out, “66 out of the 216 non-government sources were representatives of activist groups such as environmental organizations and organized labor, or demonstrators who were shown offering their opinions or shouting slogans during the protests.”

The tremendous power of the WTO protests to open up news to citizen voices was only partially successful, however. This is a kind of reverse Jesse Jackson phenomenon — a major news event occurs and the people who have engineered it abandon responsibility for interpreting its meaning for the media. This abdication of communications ensures that the journalists, desperate to fill the news hole and the news template with quotes from interested parties, will find someone to provide an interview, and that someone provides an uncontrollable and unpredictable spin on a carefully constructed news event.
Additionally, the Center study found that their local news sample included 20 statements from ordinary citizens who had no affiliation with activist groups or no “expert” credentials. “These examples of what used to be called ‘man on the street interviews’ were entirely missing from the source mix of network news. This illustrates the adage that what is not reported can be as significant as what is reported on the news. Ordinary individuals are represented in global news primarily as the victims of large impersonal forces such as wars and natural disasters.”

Ironically, the Center’s study shows the media’s collusion in excluding the public from the policy debate. “Polls of public opinion on international news were cited only twice in network newscasts and three times on the local news....Even among the average citizens who did appear as sources in the local news, several were Seattle residents who were interviewed to illustrate stories on how little ordinary people knew or cared about the debates surrounding the World Trade Organization.”

There are three important opportunities for GII communicators, which will be explored below in greater depth. First, the GII membership includes precisely the kind of academic and policy experts who have access to the news as sources. Second, the opportunity to insert soundbites into the news from established leaders should never be squandered. And, third, training ordinary citizens to provide commentary and giving them a news hook to get into the media may prove easier and more effective than we think. The literature of media and foreign policy (3) underscores the power of these interpretive cues in driving public opinion and policy; at the same time, the literature suggests that only a handful of non-governmental spokespersons are assertive in cultivating news attention.

7. Depending upon what you want to accomplish in the global arena, different issues and arguments work for and against you, and their impact is more directly related to the reasoning they set up than their literal issue domains.

The FrameWorks research serves to test a number of important hypotheses about reframing international engagement for public support, as well as to shed light on previous research findings.

A) Like A Good Neighbor
As Lakoff (14) has pointed out, the world community metaphor is often used by media and experts to explain how the world works. According to this metaphor:

“a state is a person living in a community of nations, with neighbors, friends, enemies and competitors. Strength for the state-person is military strength, while health is economic health. Since it is a person’s interest to be strong and healthy, it is a nation’s interest to be militarily strong and economically healthy. The ‘national interest’ is defined as a high level of military strength and economic health.”

We use this model all the time — Mexico is our ‘neighbor’ to the south, hostilities broke out in neighboring countries, Israel and Jordan will never be ‘friends,’ – but we are too often unaware of the consequences of our tactical choice on public reasoning about global issues. In fact, because it has easy resonance with the public, it is often recommended as a frame for policy issues. The Women’s Lens survey (D) found that the
two main roles Americans would like to see the U.S. take in the world are that of “neighbor” and “teacher.” But, as Aubrun and Grady point out (5), the policy outcomes that are likely to arise from use of the neighbor metaphor are not altogether positive:

“...in current American culture, the neighbor model refers mainly to casual and episodic interactions, or to unwanted ties and intrusions: ‘Good fences make good neighbors’ (Robert Frost). Most of the time, Americans tend to feel and act as though they have no neighbors. An important exception is that Americans like to feel they can trust their neighbors in times of crisis. In effect there are two understandings at work: The good neighbor is invisible day-to-day but on the scene when urgently needed.”

Indeed, when the neighbor model was used by people, as documented in Aubrun and Grady’s interviews (D), “it was typically in the context of either help following a natural disaster (limited engagement), or wanting to respect the autonomy of other countries (unwanted intrusions).”

The neighbor metaphor only gets you so far. It may increase support for aid at times of crises. But it is also likely to dampen American interest in international affairs; no one likes a “nosy neighbor.” In fact, as the Women’s Lens poll points out (D), 73% of Americans agree with the statement that “the U.S. should not try to change what goes on in other countries, because it is inappropriate for us to impose our values on others.” The nosy neighbor quickly evolves into the neighborhood bully, the least desirable role for the U.S. to play (D).

B) Teachers and Mentors
Both the Women’s Lens survey (D) and FrameWorks research (5, 1) explore the teacher metaphor; in the survey, “teacher” was deemed the second best choice for describing the role the U.S. should play in the world. The problem with positioning the U.S. as a teacher to other countries, is that one entailment of the metaphor is that other countries are, by definition, children. As Aubrun and Grady point out (10), “Americans’ tendency to treat the relationship between the U.S. and smaller and less industrialized countries as a relationship between a parent and a child is a barrier to the GII’s goal of promoting equilateral cooperation.” They suggest, instead, reframing this model slightly to that of a “mentor.”

Using this model, the goal of the relationship is autonomy — obviating one of the chief concerns of American engagement, that of protracted involvement to no discernible end — built upon the American model of raising children to be independent. Aubrun and Grady conclude (5):

“Both the public and policy elites are enthusiastic about the Costa Rica aid example, because it suggests that providing education leads to self-sufficiency, and reinforces the American interest in efficacy. The example perfectly illustrates and reinforces the idea of ‘mentoring for autonomy.’ It suggests that an important part of working with this general frame is to inform the public (and elites) about similar successes.”
C) The Motivational Power of Democracy

The Path to Democracy model is also often suggested as a motivating principle for Americans. As Lakoff defines it (E), “certain steps lead inevitably to democracy, e.g. capitalist markets, elections, civilian control of the military.. Dictatorships can be tolerated as long as the country has..capitalist markets and elections, which are seen as leading inevitably to democracy in the long run.”

A version of this model was at play in the recent debate over China trade policy. “When over 100 million people in China can get on the Net,” asserted President Clinton in a commencement speech the day before the Congressional vote to grant China permanent trade status, “it will be impossible to maintain a closed political and economic society” (New York Times, May 28, 2000 4:4). Here we see American confidence in the ability of a free media to transform ideology toward democratic ideals.

This approach tends to equate democracy with access to consumer goods and to view both the old and the new media as a delivery system for advertising, which is viewed as inherently democratizing: “A rising middle class first demands a decent apartment, then a car, and sooner or later a vote” (NYT, May 28, 2000, A4).

While this argument may have persuaded policymakers and other elites, who bring some different perspectives to global issues (7), it is unlikely that it did much to persuade ordinary Americans of the issue. The Women’s Lens survey (D) found the democracy argument ranked dead last among all the arguments offered as a reason for the U.S. to be active in world affairs; only 18% of Americans ranked it as an important reason, compared to 62% who felt it was important to leave a better world for future generations.

Grady and Aubrun’s analyses of the differences between expert and public opinion (8) underscore the weakness of this model for galvanizing public support: “The public is much more concerned with social and moral values. Experts are much more concerned with security and national interest...Experts are more interested than the Public in making other societies more American.” They conclude that “a communications strategy emphasizing the transformation of other nations and societies would alienate many average Americans, either because they would see it as presumptuous or because they would not see that any purpose is served by trying to change countries that play no major role in their picture of the world anyway.”

Again, the model poses problems for GII goals. If a country is indeed on the path to democracy, one cannot call attention to human rights violations or sweatshops or poor environmental practices. The model has certain entailments that tend to conceal facets of international engagement that the GII has defined as primary (see section IV below).

D. Re-examining Self-Interest

Other scholars of foreign policy opinion (A, C) have suggested that Americans need to connect their own self-interest to international issues. This has often been interpreted as a literal need to explain international issues first in the context of their domestic impact, or even to begin with a domestic problem and then demonstrate its international implications (for an example of this approach, see Bringing the World Home: Showing Readers their Global Connections, A Newsroom Handbook, The Freedom Forum and American Society of Newspaper Editors, 1999).
There are strong reasons to question the effectiveness of this approach for GII goals, arising out of both our qualitative and quantitative research. First, both the FrameWorks research and the Women’s Lens survey support the assertion that Americans’ assessment of global issues is rooted in more altruistic values, like responsibility to future generations and caring, than in narrow self-interest or nationalism.

As Aubrun and Grady put it (5), “When thinking about international relations, ordinary Americans are not driven by calculations of self-interest of the kind described by ‘rational choice’ theories.”

In fact, the fallacy of the self-interest hypothesis as it applies to international issues echoes earlier findings on environmental issues presented in *Environmental Values in American Culture* (Kempton, Boster, and Hartley, MIT Press, 1999). This study “found that environmentalism has already become integrated with core American values such as parental responsibility, obligation to descendants, and traditional religious teachings. Surprisingly, biocentric values — valuing nature for its own sake — are also important values.”

From this key finding, the authors suggest that “environmental advocates are missing an opportunity by basing their arguments primarily on utilitarian grounds (i.e., protect the rainforest because it has potential medicines)...Environmental advocates who work in the political arena tell us that utility is still a more convincing argument for politicians — it may be hard for a representative to argue for the rights of other species when his or her constituents are threatened by unemployment. However, for advocates working with the public, appealing to a broader range of values offers the potential for a broader and perhaps more deeply felt reservoir of support” (Kempton et al: 223-224).

The FrameWorks survey found substantially more support for aid to “the poorest countries” (47%) than for either of the self-interest alternatives, countries important to U.S. security (27%) and countries that the U.S. needs as trading partners (19%). The public overwhelmingly believes in the importance of cooperating with other countries (63%, 53% strongly) over just concerning ourselves with pursuing our national interests (31%, 25% strongly).

Does approaching international issues (global environment, global infections disease) through their domestic counterparts (domestic environment, domestic diseases) increase support for foreign assistance? The FrameWorks survey (6) would suggest otherwise. Comparing those who were primed by the domestic environmental set-up, compared to those primed by international environmental issues, we find weaker, not stronger, support for giving economic assistance to other countries, 56% compared to 67%. Moreover, opposition grew among those primed domestically, with 37% opposed compared to 27% among those who heard the international set-up. Similarly, there were large differences in support for promoting fair labor practices in countries where sweatshops and child labor exist and combating world poverty and hunger, with those primed globally proving significantly more supportive.

For most Americans, the equation that works to inspire international involvement is “think globally, act locally” and not the reverse.
(N.B. For more discussion and detail on this issue, see “Self Interest vs. Selfish Interest in Section IV).

E. It's Teamwork
Aubrun and Grady have suggested that one way around the weakness of the neighbor model is to transport it to a different domain: the workplace. Here, they reason, Americans have more developed models of cooperation and collaboration. To help advocates articulate this, they have developed an extensive catalogue of related frames (10).

To test the power of this frame overall, we included it as a set-up in the FrameWorks priming survey (6), expressed as follows:

“Many people feel the U.S. shoulders more than its share of the burden of dealing with international problems, such as security issues, infectious diseases, and environmental threats. It would be more fair, and more effective, to manage these challenges by working jointly with other countries, than by the U.S. working alone. By working as a team, the U.S. and other countries can pool their talents and resources to get the job done in these and other areas. When countries work together, there are payoffs on all sides.”

How did the prime affect perceptions and policy preferences? First, it is plausible; 79% agree with it, and 61% strongly. Second, it increases support for an active role in the world (+5), and slightly decreases the proportion of those who believe that United States should stay out of world affairs (-3). However, it also increases the perception that the United States is doing more than it should (+7), and depresses strong support for economic assistance (-5), while increasing mild opposition to economic assistance (+5). Finally, it significantly increases the importance of trading partners as targets for U.S. aid.

There is some discussion among FrameWorks research team members that part of the effect is due to the statement of the negative frame as opener. All things considered, GII communicators should be careful how they position this powerful business frame, as it has significant entailments that may decrease certain altruistic values in favor of self-interest.

F. Issues as Primes
There were two issues tested as interpretive prisms in our priming survey: infectious disease and the environment. For both of these, domestic and international frames were tested as primes to a wider array of global issues. While there are some interesting results from the domestic versions (see 6), we will confine comment here to the two international versions.

Both international issues served as powerful primes, putting people in a frame of mind that helped support many GII objectives. What this means is that the issues themselves, when vividly conveyed, can help drive reasoning on a host of global issues not necessarily connected to the prime by most people.
Of the two issues, however, only the global environment can be said to work as a prime for the majority of GII objectives.

As Margaret Bostrom reports (6), “when thinking internationally, the infectious disease frame increases soft support for being active in the world (+6), and increases the belief that the United States is doing less than it should (+6).” It has virtually no impact on opinions for or against assistance to other countries, compared to the global environment frame which boosts support by 15 points. On accountability, it promotes confusion, increasing the number (+4) who say they don’t know which entity is the most effective and useful source of help.

Problematically, the infectious disease frame does not help other issues. Compared to the control, the global infectious disease prime causes people’s prioritization of human rights abuses to drop by 4 points, poverty and hunger by 3 points, sweatshops and child labor by 1 point, equal education for girls by 6 points, and global environment by 7 points.

This should not dissuade GII advocates from using infectious disease as an issue focus, nor even from using it as a prime. We reiterate that it proved extremely powerful. Our research does suggest, however, that this issue requires additional explanation to overcome some of the deficits inherent in the frame itself. Paying careful attention to pack responsibility and efficacy into the frame early in the discussion, for example, may obviate some of the effects noted above.

By contrast, the global environment frame proved extremely developed and powerful for people. It worked to prioritize a host of global issues, and to provide an interpretive lens. Bostrom’s findings conclude:

“A majority of Americans would like to see funding to improve and protect the environment expanded (56% overall), particularly when they are thinking of the global environment (63%). A majority also believes it is possible to have a lot of impact on improving the domestic and global environment (59% and 57% respectively).

In addition to being an issue of public concern, the environment is a very strong frame for increasing a sense of interdependence. The environmental frame increases willingness to have an active role in the world (+6), particularly when discussed as the global environment (+9 in strong support for active role). It also increases the perception that the United States is doing less than it should (+6), again, particularly when discussed as the global environment (+9). The domestic frame has no impact on support for economic assistance, but under the global frame strong support for economic assistance increases (+15). Those hearing the global environmental frame shift to strong cooperation (+4), while those hearing the domestic frame shift toward strong national interest (+4).

The public is more likely to see private companies and the United States government as effective sources of help (+5 and +3 respectively), particularly among those who were initially thinking of the environment domestically (+8 and +4 respectively). Among those hearing the global environment frame, the
role of religious organizations is dramatically decreased (-9), but no other actor increases in responsibility."

The global environmental frame increases the importance of most other issues: it raises prioritization of human rights abuses by 6 points, sweatshops and child labor by 7 points, poverty and hunger by 7 points, global infectious disease by 6 points, and equal education for girls by 5 points.

The implications for communicating global issues are simple: using the global environment as a “warm up” issue to a discussion of global interdependence is likely to enhance positive attitudes to cooperation and assistance, to strengthen the identification of poverty, hunger, and women’s education as important foreign policy investments, and to further Americans’ willingness to engage internationally. Global environmental issues provides an effective frame for bolstering other global issues which have not yet evolved and for strengthening issues which have inherent problems.

G. Moral Norms

George Lakoff’s research (14) for the GII strongly suggests that we not overlook an important extension of the world community metaphor: international moral norms. In this metaphor:

“members of the World Community are expected to obey certain norms of behavior, just as people living in a community are expected to do. As foreign policy, the idea is to stabilize and regulate the behavior of nations by the imposition of moral norms – behaviors expected of moral nations. These behaviors are maintained by peer pressure, by international civil society, by the threat of sanctions and of being treated as an outcast and, if absolutely necessary, by force – military action – as a last resort.”

The moral norms model is extremely useful, as it lays out a coherent, systematic code for countries to follow. As Lakoff illustrates, “just as a responsible community of people must intervene when an individual gets unacceptably violent, so a responsible world community must intervene when an individual state gets unacceptably violent.” And this code conveys to other forms of unacceptable behavior, from the oppression of people to the hoarding of food and resources. And this code “requires that the U.S. set an example, that it act according to the moral norms that it advocates, that it uphold its end of treaties, pay its dues, contribute to peacekeeping forces, and so on.”

When tested as a prime in the national opinion survey, the moral norms frame elevated the importance of every issue tested, but failed to make the connection to government action. Subsequently, Lakoff went back to the drawing board and worked to pack into the frame more cues about who is responsible. The result is the following:

“The U.S. is wealthier and more powerful than any nation in the history of the world. With that position come responsibilities of various kinds. Yes we do have to set an example for the world by addressing our problems at home. But we also have to offer world leadership. And right now we’re not doing our share.”
Moreover, Lakoff identifies a series of roles the U.S. can play that incorporate responsibility for others into the model. These include:

- **The Partner:** shares responsibility and risk
- **The Example Setter:** lives by moral norms and promotes them by setting an example.
- **The Community Builder:** brings diverse parties together to get things done.
- **The Caretaker:** responsible for the children, committed to their future.

“These archetypes, taken together,” says Lakoff, “define what the role of the U.S. should ideally be in a world governed by moral norms.”

## III. Situation Analysis

The first question that arises from the research is: if the public’s opinions matter so little to policymakers, and our goal is to influence policy, why are we focusing on public opinion?

First, it’s important to note that the problems surrounding public support for international engagement are almost always framed as: How do we bring the public along? Why doesn’t the public get it? So, the very fact that we have arrived at a different understanding of the problem suggests substantial learning as a result of the research.

The answer to the original question is, quite simply, that we must investigate every aspect of the opinion/policy continuum in order to discern how we can affect it. The conventional wisdom from political science is that the media sets the public agenda which, in turn, sets the policy agenda. What we’ve learned from the FrameWorks research is that this is at best an imprecise equation as it applies to global issues. So let’s examine each of these three critical arenas and determine exactly what we now know, or think we know, about its impact on global issues.

### A. Media

**Situation:**
- less foreign news
- highly formulaic
- strong tendency toward episodic coverage
- no information about cause, effect, solutions
- serves as Americans’ primary lens on world
- dependent on public officials, elite spokespersons
- reinforces expert model
- politically polarized
- highly charged visuals break through to policymakers
- serves as proxy for public to policymakers
Problems:
- extremely difficult to change quality and quantity of news
- may do little to move public opinion, but may influence policymakers
- status quo disperses responsibility away from government accountability
- reinforces refuge stance and isolationism

Opportunities:
- GII can supply the kinds of recognized sources routinely quoted in news.
- Internet can serve as a bypass mechanism, reaching Americans with new stories about the world that better connect to, and reinforce, their values.
- Strategic communicators can play to journalism formulas (WTO) while cue-ing different values through their control of soundbites.
- Journalism education, through funder intervention, could build new formulas responsive to this research.

B. Public

Situation:
- already sympathetic to GII goals and principles
- international support often downplayed in favor of domestic issues
- easily dismissed by media and policymakers as uninformed, emotional, manipulable
- easily drowned out (squeaky wheel syndrome resulting from organized opposition)
- media is viewed as its proxy (resulting in compassion fatigue assessment)
- inarticulate, inarticulated by others (no standing, no organized intermediaries)
- easily manipulated in specific situations by primes and other cues

Problems:
- finding/giving a public voice to these issues
- weakness of intermediaries to engage in constituency building (funding, focus, expertise)
- myths and misperceptions of public communications (self-interest, etc)

Opportunities:
- Intermediaries can be strengthened to undertake constituency building.
- Intermediaries can be created to connect citizens to policymakers on these issues.
- Open up vehicles for public expression.
- Train citizen voices.
- Go direct to citizens via community media and the Internet.
C. Policymakers

Situation:
- disbelieve polls on these issues
- distrust public on these issues
- more likely to believe what they see and read in media and to confuse this with public values
- entrenched mental models, reinforced by partisan debate
- secrecy and complexity further the reliance on experts, increase isolation from public input
- no counter-pressure to spur policy reconsideration

Problems:
- potential advocates lack access and standing to this population
- campaign finance system ensures ready access for counter-perspectives
- squeaky wheel problem through highly orchestrated, organized opposition
- fear of embarrassment for articulating opinion outside the recognized elite models

Opportunities:
- Both Aspen and GII members have historic access to and track record with policymakers.
- Find new models and language to over-ride embarrassment.
- Deploy intermediaries with clout, including civic leaders and business who are seen as unlikely messengers on these issues.
- Use media strategically as the pipeline to policymakers.

A more extensive narrative version of this problem statement is presented in an introduction to the research reports entitled “Framing Studies and Global Interdependence.”

It is important to note that the plan that emerges from this situation analysis must address both communications and program. The ability to reframe, to talk back effectively to dominant models of discourse, will only take us so far. Even the most brilliant communications plan will be dependent upon the ability of organizations to inherit this work, to create programs that incorporate and advance it, and to develop new mechanisms for solving the disconnection between the public and its policymakers.

What follows is an exploration of these two challenges: (1) how to talk differently about global issues, and (2) how to think differently about what it is we need to do to change the policy debate. Both these sections incorporate the situation analysis that is provided above into practical applications.
IV. Goals and Hypotheses

How can this new understanding that emerges from the research help shape our understanding of the task at hand, in supporting cooperative multilateral responses to global challenges?

The real test of the value of the research comes in our ability to translate it into the daily work of our member organizations, informing news releases, speeches, brochures, and tactics with these new findings. The goal of the research, after all, was not to help us understand the world the way scholars do, but rather to help inform our practical application of communications to global issues. The work that follows is an example of one communicator’s learning and application of the research to a specific set of messages. It is the opinion of the author alone, and has not yet had the benefit of discussion among FrameWorks research team members.

Let’s begin by re-examining the six principles that inform the GII’s work, attempting to restate them for a public audience, based on the research. While these principles were crafted for a highly educated, expert audience, let’s view them as drafts of a speech to a citizens group, and critique them on that basis. We can assume that they reflect the goals of the GII and the ideas the GII members hope to infuse in the public discourse.

Strategic frame analysis provides three useful questions for deconstructing frames. They are: (1) what is this really about? (2) who made the problem? (3) what should be done to fix it, and who should fix it? These three questions are implicit in our analysis of these principles.

**PRINCIPLE ONE:** “The world is changing. We can change it for the better. Economic globalization can create winners and losers, both within the United States and among nations. We can and should soften its negative impacts while sharing as broadly as possible the benefits of global interdependence. It is possible to imagine a future that provides a greater measure of prosperity and participation for many more of the world’s poor and excluded. It is essential that the United States help shape such a future.”

**COMMENTS:** Change will arouse fear, and is likely to be connected to issues like technology and global warming. Most Americans think the world is changing too fast, and this tends to make them want to cocoon, so you may have set up a fear frame in your first sentence that does not put people in a mindset to consider global issues expansively. The statement that “we can change it for the better,” brings up the issue of efficacy. With few solutions or results clearly in mind, Americans have a hard time believing this argument. The benefits of global interdependence raises a self-interest model, as does prosperity. Finally, the public is likely to support a leadership role for the U.S. but to ask why we have to do it all ourselves. The statement is “about” change. It was intended, we suspect, to be “about” caring and alleviating the distress of those negatively affected by globalization. The opening frame is too strong. Moreover, it assumes that bad things just happen (no one made the problem, it’s an act of nature). And it poses the U.S. as responsible for resolution. It’s a kind of non sequitur and precisely the kind of logic that drives Americans to ask: why us? In some respects, it repeats the dominant form of news coverage, which is unlikely to accord responsibility or to strengthen efficacy.
**SUGGESTIONS:** Begin with the values you know Americans hold and provide them a lens through which to evaluate the rest of your statement, or an issue prime that helps follow the reasoning of your proposal.

For example:

We all want to leave the world a better place for future generations. To do that, we must protect the global environment, working with other countries to set out rules we can all live by. It also means sharing our expertise with countries that are trying hard to rise to the next level. We’ve made big strides in this country on important issues, but no country goes it alone in this new global environment. As Americans, we care about working toward a world where all people have opportunities to raise their families, go to school, and earn decent wages.

From this point on, it is important that the statement include a specific problem that has a solution that sets up American know-how and cooperation as the logical response. An example would help vivify the statement for the public.

For more information on how to reframe this principle, see section on “mentoring for autonomy” in Aubrun and Grady’s Catalog of Recommended Frames and Language (10).

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**PRINCIPLE TWO:** “Values matter. The United States should stand for cooperation, individual liberty, transparency, sustainability, and justice, and for principles like the Golden Rule. Advances in global communications allow increasingly for norms to be genuinely global, and for people to hold government, business and other institutions accountable to these norms. Holding our institutions and ourselves accountable to these norms is part of our work as citizens.”

**COMMENTS:** Aside from the reliance on experts’ code words (transparency, norms), this is a good statement of the moral norms model. It begins by connecting to a widespread concern among Americans: the decline of values. It is likely to conjure those values. The second line would be clearer and more powerful if it restated the Golden Rule; it serves as the prime for everything that follows. Use simpler words like fairness for justice, citizen input or government accountability for transparency, freedom not individual liberty, and problem-solving or results not sustainability. Good incorporation of responsibility and line of authority from citizens to their government; needs more detail on how we do that. Global communications seems somewhat weak as the motivator for a new model.

This statement is “about” doing unto others as we would have them to unto us. The problem is, by default, that until global communications came along we couldn’t hold other countries accountable to these same norms (weak). And responsibility is on U.S. citizens to create and enforce global norms.

**SUGGESTIONS:** Refer to the section on America as a decent person in Aubrun and Grady’s Catalog of Recommended Frames and Language (10). And, while it did less to
incorporate responsibility than the statement above, consider the moral norms statement tested in the FrameWorks survey (6):

Countries around the world are becoming increasingly dependent upon each other because they realize that most problems don’t stop at borders. Through international laws and treaties, countries get together to agree upon a basic set of shared values and a code of behavior that all countries should respect and respond to. We stand together against those countries that violate basic standards of behavior through torture, terrorism and pollution. We encourage and support countries that are trying hard to do better. We share the vision of a better world for all people and we support its development by cooperating with countries throughout the world in setting standards we can all live up to, and in upholding those standards.

**PRINCIPLE THREE:** “We’re at our best when we are doing our share. A cooperative approach to global problem-solving — doing our share to build a better world — is consistent with values that Americans have long cherished. The United States currently spends less than one percent of its federal budget on international affairs, far less than other prosperous nations. We can afford to carry our fair share of international responsibilities while doing what we need to do for ourselves here at home; in fact, if we don’t do our share internationally, caring for each other here will end up being more costly.”

**COMMENTS:** This is “about” doing our share, a social norm. We are living up to our image as Americans when we exercise American know-how and take pride in our leadership. All good so far. The U.S. is currently not doing its share, the statement asserts. That’s likely to be discounted, either as fiction, liberal propaganda or to be dismissed (1). See section on “just 1%” in Aubrun and Grady (10). If you are going to state it, and we are not suggesting against this, you will need to explain it: how other countries are investing, how we stopped paying our UN dues, etc., and the impact this has on the world. Causes and consequences. Finally, the linked investment idea (our fate depends on their fate) is undeveloped.

**SUGGESTIONS:** Develop other examples of effective investments by other developed countries in developing countries that yielded results. This strongly held belief that the U.S. is carrying the whole load may be best addressed through a series of examples that inspire, rather than trying to negate the numbers.

**PRINCIPLE FOUR:** “Military and economic power are not enough. The security of the United States cannot be defended by military force, nor purchased through our economic prowess. Sometimes military force is the appropriate tool. American products, investments and entrepreneurship can help generate global prosperity. Genuine, long-term security, however, requires that the United States be a reliable partner in pursuing social stewardship as well.”

**COMMENTS:** This statement appears to be “about” military might. The negative opening statement only serves to put us in the military frame. It is also likely to incite opposition among those who think military might is important, even though they may hold some useful conflicting values. The statement even goes so far as cede ground to the opposition by stating that sometimes military force is the right tool. That’s likely to
be the take-away from this passage. Indeed, there is no reason offered for reconsidering the old model, no impetus for re-examination. It also downplays the role of the U.S. economy, not likely to be readily accepted. The term social stewardship will not mean much to ordinary Americans and, as Lakoff points out (9) tends to reinforce hierarchical and utilitarian reasoning.

Implicit in this passage is the notion that other countries are making problems to which the U.S. is responding inappropriately by using military force. The likely response is to place responsibility on other countries to fix their own problems, while we stay at home and concentrate on our economy. Again, the notion of why America is responsible for generating global prosperity is likely to be a problem in this positioning.

SUGGESTIONS: Don’t lead with the negative. Decide that the statement is about redefining national security. For example:

National security encompasses many aspects of a country’s internal and external health: its economic, political and social health, its relationships and reputation among other countries, as well as its military might. OR, provide a reason for re-examining the old frame. New opportunities and challenges arise for many countries in light of the end of the Cold War. National security now encompasses....

Or provide more vivid reasons for this shift. For example: The child that grows up hungry and homeless is more likely to resort to force than the child that got early education and health care. Assistance is an investment in America’s future security.

Emphasize the partner frame; refer to the section on Workplace Cooperation - Partnership and New Management in Aubrun and Grady’s Catalog of Recommended Frames and Language (10).

PRINCIPLE FIVE: “We can’t do it alone. American leadership is often welcome in the world, especially when it takes cooperative forms. We can play on a team; we don’t always need to be captain. Our security, health, and prosperity are intimately tied to the security, health and prosperity of people throughout the world. We can’t achieve real security for ourselves or our children by going it alone. The United States and other international organizations have contributed to some remarkable successes in meeting global challenges. It’s in our self-interest to help these institutions do better; dropping out isn’t the answer.”

COMMENTS: The opening negative reinforces Americans’ sense that they are doing it alone: where’s everybody else? Why don’t we see them doing their share on TV? How come it’s always us? Second, the idea that American leadership is often welcome may inflame the opposition; since we’re always bailing countries out and footing the bill, why shouldn’t we be welcome? OR, it may conjure its opposite, as people assess its truth — terrorism against our embassies, American flags burning. The assertion that we have been successful needs back-up; Americans cannot imagine success, having seen few examples of it in the news. And finally, while the idea of dropping out is an interesting one, it is a non sequitur. The rest of the passage does not support this education-based conclusion.
SUGGESTIONS: Refer to the section on Workplace Cooperation - Partnership in Aubrun and Grady’s Catalog of Recommended Frames and Language (10). Here’s an alternative re-statement:

America’s success in the world depends on our ability to collaborate effectively with other countries. We have to build teamwork into our foreign policy, because no country is powerful enough to protect the global environment or prevent global diseases all by itself. When other societies are in good shape economically and socially, they make good partners; so we provide disabled. To manage these new partnerships, we need to listen to the best ideas of other countries, take advice and coach the talents of all the players.

PRINCIPLE SIX: “Individual actions matter. In our communities, in our work, as citizens and even as consumers, we can help shape a global future that works for all of us.”

COMMENTS: Convincing a public raised on American television news that their actions matter is a very tough challenge. While it is absolutely true that we must increase Americans’ sense of efficacy, this must be a long-term goal. Beginning with this weak frame is unlikely to establish the reasoning you desire on the remaining assertions.

Begin, instead, with a statement of principle. For example: It’s important to do the right thing, to demonstrate to our children and people of the world our commitment to make the world a better place to our children and to other peoples. The actions we take today add up to the future direction of the world. It is ineffective and inefficient to attack problems like global pollution and infectious diseases one country at a time. In a world where borders matter less and less, we must act on the fact that all parts must be in good shape for the world to run smoothly.

Refer to the section on Global Systems in Aubrun and Grady’s Catalog of Recommended Frames and Language (10).

This exercise of deconstructing a passage, anticipating its impact on the public, and reframing for greater consistency and effectiveness is meant as a model only. Certainly, any of these passages could be developed to suit specific policy goals of individual organizations. But our point here is to demonstrate how the research can inform this process, and help create an overarching set of messages that, repeated over time, begin to provide the necessary counterpoint to the dominant frames of current global discourse.

VI. Additional Applications of the Framing Research

Here’s the way one might frame a simple statement about the UN, using moral norms, partner and community-builder frames:

The United Nations is our international problem solver. The UN brings scientific and medical research teams together to address the problems facing
our world, from the outbreak of new viruses to the eradication of old diseases. It’s the world’s most effective partnership, harnessing the expertise of dozens of countries. And we have a big stake in its success. Without the World Health Organization, the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta can’t help Americans prepare for the flu season, developing resistant vaccines based on international experience.

Here’s a simple answer to the question ‘why do we need to support foreign aid,’ that draws from what Lakoff calls ‘Pragmatist Who Cares’ and the Moral Norms model:

Foreign aid is effective and practical. It yields benefits for everyone, including the U.S. If follows naturally from the priorities most Americans hold about the way the U.S. should act in the world community. And it’s the right thing to do.

In an early draft of a white paper on foreign policy, InterAction set out the idea that, in order to help others, the U.S. must be strong itself – an idea that Lakoff advances:

“...Preserving a vibrant and growing U.S. economy is vital. Clearly, U.S. assistance in the developing world when properly implemented positively impacts the U.S. economy. Eighty percent of the foreign aid budget boosts the U.S. economy by expanding markets for American good and services...By addressing problems in the developing world, the U.S. helps build and sustain a strong consumer base for U.S. goods and services and thereby increases the number of U.S. trading partners and subsequently promotes American jobs.”

But that first draft failed to complete Lakoff’s equation: the country that is strong then uses its strength to bring others along, to advance larger goals in the world. On the second draft, a promising paragraph got even better by balancing wealth with moral health, and inserting the idea that “to those to whom much is given much is required.”

Many of the profiles in the Institute for Sustainable Communities’ 2001 Report use the Mentoring for Autonomy model, showcasing the role U.S. organizations can play in lending expertise to others so that they can solve problems:

“A worker at the Amurbio-farm Tea Company dries sea-buckthorn berries, which are sustainably harvested from the nearby taiga. ISC’s project gives Russians good examples like this of how to create jobs and invest in their economy in ways that enhance rather than threaten natural resources.”

Finally, there is this quote from President Clinton that combines moral norms and teamwork into an especially effective soundbite:

“I believe that one of the fundamental facts of the modern world is that we are growing more and more interdependent within our communities, our nation and beyond our borders. I believe that, therefore, successful social work, including economics, is becoming more and more like winning the national basketball championship. It’s a team sport.”

President Clinton, Chicago, January 9, 2001, as reported in The Washington Post, Wednesday, January 10, A9
VII. A Framing Strategy for Promoting Interdependence

Combining frames from the research can give your message the best possible chance of connecting to the public’s innate understanding of global interdependence. In this section, we provide a general recommendation for structuring each sequential section of a communication, and then demonstrate how it might be realized with reference to the specific topical issue of global infectious disease. The “Framing Checklist” that follows this “Message Memo” can be used to ensure that you incorporate the GII research and its framing lessons into any communication your organization is drafting on a specific issue.

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1. Try to get your audience in a global environment mindset. Here’s an example of how to do this:

We live in a global environment. No one can stop the air quality in one country from influencing another. The health of the oceans is affected by the actions of many countries. And today diseases that begin in one country are carried halfway around the globe by mosquitoes, by tourists and business travelers, and food exports. Infectious diseases know no boundaries. So, instead of trying to erect useless barriers, we need to engage in the world and prevent problems.
before they spread. The world of tomorrow will take even more international teamwork.

2. Don’t try to acknowledge where you think most people begin; see “Don’t Think About Elephants” in Section VI for an explanation of why this is a bad tactic. Don’t start off with a frame that reinforces the dominant news frame of global mayhem by stating that the world is a scary place. While the following example may sound good on the face of it, it cues up the refuge stance that Cultural Logic documented, and therefore advantages more isolationist, defensive and containment-oriented policies, rather than global engagement and cooperation. Here’s an example of what NOT to do:

America has an opportunity to make the world safer than ever for our children and for ourselves. The Cold War has ended, lifting the spectre of nuclear war.....The new threat on the horizon is not military but microbial, but it is just as deadly.

3. Tell stories of shared leadership – for example, the role that the UN system plays or other multilateral efforts – while showcasing group problem-solving involving expertise from many countries, including the active participation of poorer countries helped. Try to foreground the expertise of other groups and countries, and the theme of working side by side for mutual benefit. See “Telling Stories” in Section VI for more detailed suggestions. Use these suggestions strategically to counter the belief that the US is doing it all or at least more than its share. Overall, the story you tell should be about teamwork, as in the following statement:

America’s success in the world depends on our ability to collaborate effectively with other countries. We have to build teamwork into our foreign policy, because no country is powerful enough to protect the global environment or prevent global diseases all by itself. When other societies are in good shape economically and socially, they make good partners; so we give them a hand and some coaching. To manage these new partnerships, we need to listen to the best ideas of other countries, take advice and coach the talents of all the players.

4. Stress efficacy. Remember that the dominant media frame for international issues is “global mayhem” in which preventable events – from famines and poverty to wars and diseases – are equated with acts of nature, and no cause or solution presented to the American public. To overcome this mindset, you will need to demonstrate that problems can be prevented, that we actually can have an impact on the world. Quite simply, you want to make the point that there are causes that we have an opportunity to address long before these crises develop:

Every country we successfully help (with development aid) is a war we won’t have to fight, a crisis we won’t have to intervene in.

In earlier GII research, an example like the following met with great interest and support from informants:

We gave Costa Rica foreign aid for some years, which helped to provide basic health care, safe drinking water, and free primary and secondary education to all
of its citizens. That country worked alongside us to improve the lives of its people. Today, adult literacy rates in Costa Rica are 94%, and infant mortality is now at a level that is comparable to that of most developed countries. Costa Rica’s per capita income is now among the highest in Latin America, and Costa Rica no longer requires foreign aid.

5. Hold policymakers accountable. Since the “call to action” for most social issues is not as simple as “buckle up,” you will need to make a direct statement about what Americans can and should do to support your organization, the US, the UN or other vehicle in its problem-solving role. You must both raise and answer the question: so what’s the problem here?

The US hasn’t given the UN a pay raise in more than four decades, even though our investment in eradicating smallpox saved this country $17 billion in domestic health care costs.

OR

When your team is doing well, you don’t back out. The UN has proven itself an effective disease-fighting organization, enlisting the expertise of many nations. Why, then, isn’t Congress backing this preventive force?

DON’T try to state directly that the US isn’t paying its fare share, as this will be resisted.

6. If you quote experts or use messengers, choose those who are seen as being both knowledgeable and unlikely to lie to the public on this issue; “unlikely allies” might include business leaders who are expected to be concerned about the bottom line, not the humanitarian impact of policies, or doctors/scientists attesting to the contribution of another country’s scientific expertise when they might be expected to favor US expertise.

Use domestic policy activists to make the connection to global issues; for example, a US pediatrician might say:

“Protecting children today means thinking locally and acting globally to keep our water, air, and food supply pollution-free and disease-free. No child lives in a gated community in today’s world.”

7. Talk about international or global issues, not foreign issues. Avoid less effective analogies like neighbor, parent, social worker, nanny, or policeman; scrutinize the country-as-people metaphors and don’t let the US become “Uncle Sam,” for example. DO use the litmus test of the US as a decent person in the world. DO substitute “mentor” for “teacher.” Resist the tendency to use metaphors and motivators that don’t energize people, such as the “path to democracy” and self-interest.

DON’T allow infectious disease to be equated with foreign-ness, or weakness or certain people. That is the downside of this particular disease: its easy migration from physical to moral disease. The global environment prime is an insurance policy against this tendency, but review your copy carefully to make sure that you have not inadvertently given out cues that connect the infectious disease to country conditions or population characteristics that undercut the idea that “this could happen to anyone.”

DON’T spend a lot of time thinking you have to make the connection to local impact and local self-interest; the public is already there, it’s the policymakers that need to be able to
convince themselves of these connections and to incorporate them into their own positions and discourse.

8. Appeal to moral values, to the desire to make the world a better place, to the value of nature for its own sake, the right thing to do, and to the Golden Rule, as in the following examples:

   We all want to leave the world a better place for future generations. To do that, we must protect the global environment, working with other countries to set out rules we can all live by. It also means sharing our expertise with countries that are trying hard to rise to the next level. We’ve made big strides in this country on important issues, but no country goes it alone in this new global environment. As Americans, we care about working toward a world where all people have opportunities to raise their families, go to school, earn decent wages, and live and work in environments that are disease-free.

OR

   Countries around the world are becoming increasingly dependent upon each other because they realize that most problems don’t stop at borders. Through international laws and treaties, countries get together to agree upon a basic set of shared values and a code of behavior that all countries should respect and respond to. We stand together against those countries that violate basic standards of behavior through torture, terrorism and pollution. We encourage and support countries that are trying hard to do better, to get their citizens off to a healthy, productive start in life, to raise new leaders. We share the vision of a better world for all people and we support its development by cooperating with countries throughout the world in setting standards we can all live up to, and in upholding those standards. The UN is our problem-solving organization: how we set standards, how we help countries and kids get off to a good start.

OR

   It’s important to do the right thing, to demonstrate to our children and people of the world our commitment to make the world a better place. The actions we take today add up to the future direction of the world. It is ineffective and inefficient to attack problems like global pollution and infectious diseases one country at a time. In a world where borders matter less and less, we must act on the fact that all parts of the globe must be in good shape for the world to run smoothly.

DO link preventing infectious disease around the world to being active in the world and providing foreign assistance. DO draw upon the language of the workplace and team sports for analogies like win-win assistance or engagement, joint decision-making, joint ventures, and coaching other players. DO use metaphors of teamwork and partnership, as in the following example:

   By working as a team, the US and other countries can pool their talents and resources to get the job done. When countries work together, there are payoffs on all sides. Foreign assistance is a win-win proposition for disease prevention at home and abroad.

9. Use public opinion research to good effect in pushing policymakers to justify their positions. Point out the difference between the public and policymakers on these issues, and point out the difference to reporters. For example, the GII survey data, Steve Kull’s
work, Ethel Klein’s survey review for Oxfam and Beldon Russonello & Stewart’s report for the Women’s Lens on Global Issues can all be used powerfully in op/eds to point out that the public is leading on global issues and the policymakers are still stuck in “old think” about national security and fighting the next war:

For the public, the next war is happening now in New Jersey, New York, Maryland and other states where the West Nile Virus promises to take its toll on Americans because we didn’t use our scientific and humanitarian resources early on to stop the disease before it crossed our borders.

DO quote ordinary citizens, especially those with high civic visibility, who are willing to say, “we need a new approach to international policies and programs that recognizes we live in a global environment.”

The child that grows up hungry and homeless is more likely to resort to force than the child that got early education and health care. Assistance is an investment in America’s future security.

10. Use the GII research as a shopping list for effective metaphors. You don’t have to make up your language anew with each brochure or speech; try to write from these metaphors again and again, so that your communications add up to a consistent worldview. The “Catalog of Recommended Frames and Language” that follows this “Message Memo” in rich in illustrations of ways to help direct NGO communications on specific issues.

For example, here’s a collection of suggestions specific to frame infectious disease:

Foreign health problems are U.S. health problems.
The public health endeavor is a source of optimism.
Public health is a matter of education.
Public health is a matter of prevention.
Public health spending is less subject to criticism than other forms of spending.
Would you rather let other countries worry about global issues like infectious disease, or make sure that American expertise is being applied?
Beating infectious disease requires a sustained effort.
The public’s model of public health largely agrees with the Expert (medical) model.

They are further developed by the researchers, and we repeat these below:

Foreign health problems are U.S. health problems.
Americans readily understand that many diseases today “know no borders.” They also find it both unrealistic and un-American to try to seal the borders against foreign disease. It is easy for both the public and policy elites to think of infectious disease in terms of a “global system” perspective. People understand that where the world goes, so too goes America.
The public health endeavor is a source of optimism.
Americans have a positive attitude towards public health agencies, such as the CDC, the WHO, or the NIH. The public health endeavor elicits ideas of efficacy and knowledge; people trust medical practitioners.

Public health is a matter of education.
The public believes that most public health issues are “90% education.” As a result, the public health endeavor lends itself to the model of “mentoring for autonomy.”

Public health is a matter of prevention.
A related American understanding is that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

Would you rather let other countries worry about global issues like infectious disease, or make sure that American expertise is being applied?
The American beliefs that the U.S. knows best, and that most public health problems have solutions, combine in this framing to promote engagement.

Beating infectious disease requires a sustained effort.
This general frame provides a way of working around the public’s avoidance of long-term engagement with others. In the American folk understanding, infectious diseases can constitute emergencies, but also require long-term efforts at control. Related terms are hygiene and prevention.

VIII. A Programmatic Strategy for Promoting Interdependence

As stated above, the second challenge the research suggests is programmatic. Not only do GII members need to create a new discourse, but they must find ways to embed this new language in ongoing activities that reach media, the public and policymakers consistently over time. The broad outline of such a plan is presented above in the “opportunities” sections of the situation analysis.

What follow are three very specific, concrete directives and related activities that further these broader goals.

A. Get out in front of media, and come behind it.

One way to harness the power of media to reach policymakers is to get out in front of a news event and to be the first to define its significance and meaning. There are several ways to do this.

First, op/eds can be submitted using the authority of GII members, board members, academics and other experts to interpret the meaning of news about to break. For example, next week, President Clinton will meet with the Group of Eight leaders; here’s what’s at stake. OR, the political nominating conventions are likely to see protests that echo the Battle for Seattle; the issues they want on the political agenda are the same ones
many Americans favor. Even if the op/ed editor declines to go out ahead of the news, you are likely to find the article runs after the fact, once the hard news story leads.

Second, pursue commentary opportunities aggressively. This means positioning the heads of GII organizations, board members, etc. as willing and able to comment on breaking news. Perfecting soundbites, and filling out the rolodexes of key reporters with others who can do so as well, will allow GII members to provide the interpretive spin on the news that Americans need to make sense of international issues and events. We’ll be providing more information in the forthcoming toolkit on how to bridge from hostile and ill-informed questions to the frames you wish to put forward. But it takes a commitment from both the communications director and the executive to prioritize this activity.

Never yield your soundbite to chance, as was done in the WTO and IMF/World Bank protests. The journalists must be taken to your leader. Even if your leadership is shared, provide 3 or 4 trained communicators who can and will speak for the group and interpret what it is doing and why.

Third, connect media with both experts and citizens in ways that overcome the media’s myth that Americans are not interested in global issues. Take a reporter to lunch with three business leaders whom you’ve helped train and inform about GII goals and messages. Editorial board visits, backgrounders on issues and public opinion, press briefings, story suggestions that are fundamentally new — all of these begin to create more space in the news media for the new global discourse.

You can exert some control over news interpretation even after the fact through the letters to the editor. Help concerned citizens write and place short well-framed comments that demonstrate public interest in an international issue as well as interpret its meaning for readers. Since editorial usually follows news, edit boards can also be accessed after a story breaks.

What is the goal of this intensified use of media? It is three-fold: (1) to convince policymakers that Americans care about these issues, by letting the media serve as proxy for public opinion; (2) to provide new interpretive lenses and language that seed into public discourse ways for ordinary Americans to articulate their core beliefs; and (3) to provide the missing elements of the frame — responsibility, solutions, cause and effect, etc. — that would connect American values to political views and actions.

B. Control your own communications.

The websites, annual reports, newsletters, and other routine communications vehicles of GII members and friends reach many, many Americans. The FrameWorks research should be used to prompt a re-examination of how well these vehicles are serving to reframe global issues for public understanding and support. An audit of the main vehicles is a good way to start.

Second, GII members influence and inspire many communicators: at the national, state and local levels. Helping them understand how to talk about global issues is an important part of building an articulate constituency. You can do this by building communications training into chapter capacity-building and creating new mechanisms for training and deploying “unlikely allies,” especially those who can reach policymakers.
C. Organize new infrastructures to connect citizens and policymakers.

The media is an important but unreliable link, and a distorted one at that. Campaign contributions and big money drown out all but very consistent and powerful citizen voices. On other important national issues, policymakers complain that they never hear any citizen voices except activist ones, whom they discount. Policymakers need to hear from “trusted intermediaries,” often defined as ordinary constituents, or at least those constituents most likely to matter to their re-election: business and civic leaders, the heads of major endorsing organizations like teacher’s unions, leaders of important swing constituencies like soccer moms and Hispanics, and the core voting groups like seniors.

GII members need to work to put in place not sporadic meetings between an elected official and an interest group, but sustained forums for powerful citizen voices to find expression to policymakers. These citizens, trained in the lessons of communicating global issues, will, over time, create a policy environment that allows officials to break with the status quo, to find new language and policy options to overcome their timidity on global issues.

This does not require a complete act of invention. Some of the “old” infrastructures remain vital places for framing opinions. In an article entitled “Upon This Rock: The Black Church, Nonviolence, and the Civil Rights Movement,” Allison Calhoun-Brown demonstrates how “the culture of the black church helped leaders to frame the meaning of

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<td>5. Enlist trusted intermediaries to address citizens and policymakers.</td>
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<td>6. Create new forums for interaction and discussion.</td>
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<td>8. Make calls to action specific, and help people practice and fulfill them.</td>
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<td>9. Move your metaphors into common speech and regular forums.</td>
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<td>10. See your communications and program activities as organically connected.</td>
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the nonviolent message and encouraged churchgoers to respond to it positively (PS: Political Science and Politics, June 2000:173). She quotes Andrew Young:

“Nobody could have ever argued segregation and integration and gotten people to do anything about that. But when Martin would talk about leaving the slavery of Egypt and wandering into the promised land; somehow that made sense to folks. And they may not have understood it; it was nobody else’s political theory, but it was their grassroots ideology. It was their faith...And when they saw in their faith also a liberation struggle that they could identify with, then you kind of had ‘em boxed. They all wanted to be religious. And when you finally helped them see that religion meant involvement in action, you kinda had ‘em hooked then.”

The programmatic challenge for the Global Interdependence Initiative is to find those places where Americans gather to understand the world and to explore meaning — whether in church or synagogue, civic or business club, party or political interest group — and to use these places to discuss global interdependence in ways that connect identity to action.

Susan Nall Bales
FrameWorks Institute
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